When the EU and South Africa acceded to a strategic partnership, they expanded into new areas of partnership. One of these areas was peace and security, which is the focus of this article. The article argues that although there appears to be a shared understanding of what security means, the strategic partnership has not been utilised significantly to further this understanding in practice. This is largely due to the EU's preferences for a continental, multilateral approach over the bilateralism of a strategic partnership. At the same time, South Africa sees its strategic partnership with the EU as being outside of its broader commitment to regional security. As a result the peace and security element of the strategic partnership has not been leveraged effectively despite several entry points for action. The article thus concludes that both the EU and South Africa need to re-think the current arrangement.
Introduction
This article examines how notions of security in the European Security Strategy South Africa are concerned, the argument is that it is necessary to look to the practice of security by the EU at the regional/continental level.
This preference for regional/continental security cooperation and practice can be explained by how the EU sees itself and the way it has constructed security as part of its international relations. This self-understanding informs the practice of security in the EUs engagement with South Africa and Africa more broadly on peace and security. Following an examination of how the EU enacts peace and security, the article highlights some potential areas of cooperation between the two strategic partners. In analysing whether, and the extent to which, the strategic partnership is used to enhance regional security, the article concludes with some reflections on what limited partnership in this area might mean for the future of the EU-South Africa Strategic Partnership on peace and security.
Before delving into the main analysis, it is worth considering the data collection and analysis methods used. The arguments made here and the analysis developed relies on a qualitative approach to research that includes process tracing and broad discourse analysis as methods. Process tracing is applied to official documents, press releases, In other words, the analysis within this article identifies the ways in which the meaning of EU-SA relations are fixed as unique, and consequently what implications this has in relation to peace and security in the context of the last decade of the strategic partnership. By undertaking discourse analysis, this assessment gives equal
worth to text and speech as research sources, while providing insights into specific practices in EU-SA relations since the establishment of their strategic partnership, as well as some unintended consequences within this unique context.
Peace and Security -a discursive exclusion
In 2007, the European Union (EU) and South Africa signed a strategic partnership.
This has already been identified as significant, with the recurring refrain that this is the only strategic partnership the EU has with an African country. This accession to the level of strategic partnership appears a seemingly monumental shift in relations between the two polities. However, the terms of the partnership, as articulated in the formal agreement, emphasised that the partnership was predicated on prior relations in trade, development, and science and technology innovations.
Importantly, however, the partnership framework also laid the groundwork for expanding on additional areas of cooperation and engagement. Here, there are new If one accepts this understanding of EU-SA relations (and within those relations, the strategic partnership), and of Africa-EU relations, then a more nuanced understanding of the position of peace and security begins to emerge. To gain a full understanding it is most fruitful to look outside of the strategic partnership, turning to practices at the regional/continental level. In doing so, it is then possible to identify the evolution of the EU's construction of security as part of its regional identity, and its preference for particular priorities in security practice by drawing on the experiential and normative dimensions of security.
Constructing the EU in Africa: An extra-regionalist case for human security
The starting point for the EU's engagement in Africa is the ESS. Through this framework, the EU articulates its normative responsibility to promote a world that enjoys peace and security. The EU's understanding of security is thus experiential.
Therefore, 'peace and security' is conceptualised as not just a national good, as is typical of states in their practise of international relations, but a regional one.
Regional approaches to political practices are well grounded within the Areas Studies and International Relations literature. Regionalism refers to strategic coordination and cooperation within a given region. 8 This does not exclude national preference or action. Rather, it reflects the institutionalisation of certain discursive and material practices that allow us to speak of 'the EU' as a security actor on the one hand, but that also help us to understand the national policies of South Africa that make the African region a focus of its foreign policy identity.
International Relations theories offer competing explanations for why regional security cooperation happens. For neo-realists, the pressures of certain security 'threats' allow states to come together in response to the threat. 9 In other words, security cooperation is based on the relative interests of the states and is only sustained as long as that interest remains. Some critical security theorists suggest other explanations through the Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT). 10 RSCT was conceptualised by Barry Buzan and further developed with Ole Waever as part of the broad theorising of the Copenhagen School approach to security. 11 They argue that trends in international security practice are increasingly regionalised. This is due to both the nature of security threats, and the responses to these threats, which are constrained from travelling over long distances. While RSCT conclusions on the nature of insecurity are downright problematic, especially with respect to its portrayal of the subaltern, RSCT represents some theoretical and empirical justifications for notions of security as regional.
It makes sense, then, that the EU's understanding of security is informed by its selfidentity as a regional entity. This is especially based on the perception that a regional approach has guaranteed security for Europe and thus, this is a perspective that the EU seeks to export. 12 In other words, it aims to conduct its foreign security relations at the regional level. This is the practice that has been observed in EU engagements on security in Africa. The result is that even in its bilateral relationships in Africa, In 1994, the White Paper on Intelligence, which sets the tone for South Africa's security vision stated: 13 The intermingling and transnational character of modern-day security issues furthermore indicates that solutions to the problems of insecurity are beyond the direct control of any single country
In the 2011 White Paper on South Africa's Foreign Policy, the following is noted: 14 Our struggle for a better life in South Africa is intertwined with our pursuit of a better Africa in a better world. Its destiny is inextricably linked to that of the Southern African region. Regional and continental integration is the foundation for Africa's socio-economic development and political unity, and essential for our own prosperity and security. Sub-Saharan Africa is poorer now than it was 10 years ago. In many cases, economic failure is linked to political problems and violent conflict.
Security is a precondition of development.
Here, the EU sets the tone for how it understands responses to insecurity as a link between traditionally divergent areas. What is further striking is that whereas five distinct threats where identified, only one of them is positioned as being linked or triggering the others. This is regional conflict. In identifying security as a precondition for development, EU policy, as articulated by the ESS, is further explicit about its prioritisation of regional responses to insecurity.
The ESS for example states that regional organisations like the AU are important for 'a more orderly world'.
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This further underscores the EU's normative approach to tackling insecurity through regional approaches. This of course means that meaningful engagement in the area of peace and security must in part appear to accept this normative frame. Indeed, following the 13 th Ministerial Dialogue between the EU and South Africa (2016) , the official record of the meeting -a joint press releaseaddresses peace and security only within the context of regional cooperation.
Specifically, item 9 titled Regional Cooperation states: 'South Africa and the European Union agreed to continue co-operation on peace and security in the continent'. Moreover, South African scholars Cheryl Hendricks 36 and Jakkie Cillers 37 have argued convincingly that, with reference to South Africa specifically, human security is the frame for security that takes the region as the site of its foreign security policies.
It is worth noting that while there is no consensus among scholars on the definition of human security, 38 the narrative of security that includes different threats and referents beyond the state captures this approach. The EU approach further states that 'massive violations of the right to food, health and housing may also be considered in this category, although their legal status is less elevated', and like the African one, 'offers a language for addressing different experiences of (in)security'. 39 In addition to the links made between traditional security concerns and areas usually framed as development, the EU's take on human security reflects its regional (and extraregional) aspirations. The Madrid Report justifies the EU's normative security aspirations in this way: 40 A human security approach for the European Union means that it should contribute to the protection of every individual human being and not focus only on the defence of the Union's borders, as was the security approach of nation-states.
We thus see how human security can be used as a framework for regional security practice within the security-development nexus. in which there is convergence. These areas include: capacity building, crisis management, and the promotion of gender equality as an intersecting security priority.
Capacity building through institution building
The support of the EU for capacity building initiatives in the African security context was first articulated in the first action plan of the JAES. In addition to supporting the establishment of a predictable funding source for peace support operations, the EU made a commitment to enhance dialogue on peace and security challenges and fully operationalise all aspects of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). In the years since the establishment of the JAES, the EU has remained a significant actor in developing the capabilities of the APSA. In the commitment to capacity building for peace and security in Africa, there are some areas of overlaps in EU and South Africa perspectives. Specifically it is in the area of dialogue that the strategic partnership has been utilised. Arguably, this is the case because it provides the space for dialogue and it is relatively benign compared to typical hard security areas. It is a forum through which the discourse of the securitydevelopment nexus and human security can be articulated. In this area, South Africa has the opportunity to shine without incurring negative feedback about its preferences for bilateralism. At the same time, the EU is able to use the strategic partnership as a part of its broader strategy for promoting regionalism in its external relations. From the perspective of the EU, South Africa's long-standing role in peace support operations in Africa and as regional security actor is advantageous to its own aims of peace and security on the continent. 53 To use the strategic partnership as the basis for crisis management provides the opportunity to underscore that normative commitment of both actors to a specific understanding of security. Furthermore, it allows the EU to fulfil its commitments to promoting the local ownership of peace and security processes.
However, since ARTEMIS, and despite the development of the strategic partnership, there has not been a move to deepen EU-South Africa engagements on crisis management. Indeed, when the EU thinks of a crisis management partner in Africa, the AU remains the preferred choice. 54 Thus, while South Africa's experience in regional and military crisis management is valued, presently, it is through the AU that the EU envisions its contributions. Many scholars have identified that the EU views itself as a gender equal actor across all its policy domains. 55 While not always successful in adhering to practices that ensure equality, this narrative of the EU as a gender equal actor forms a fundamental core of its regional identity. Indeed, the EU has consistently endorsed the UN's gender equality framework on peace and security, the Women, Peace and Security In other words, the WPS aspires to a peaceful system that caters to all humans, values rights and demands justice. In the foregoing, however, it is important to pay extra attention to the utility of language and its inadvertent narrative. The EU makes allowance for instituting strategic partnerships for the specific purpose of implementing the WPS Agenda; but it only names other regional and international organisations as partners. Third countries feature as generic. WPS here is thus not prioritised as a space for engagement within existing strategic partnerships but rather a site for forging new and specific strategic partnerships.
Moreover, while both the EU and South Africa subscribe to this normative framework, gender concerns have not featured as an integral part of public utterances on peace and security cooperation within the strategic partnership. For example, although the strategic partnership was signed seven years after UNSCR 1325 was 61 .
By examining three different areas where the EU has had the opportunity to leverage its strategic partnership with South Africa and fulfil its own regional security imperative this article presents a comprehensive view of EU peace and security
capabilities. Yet, the dominant narrative that emerges from this analysis is that this unique relationship is rarely used coherently. The EU continues to have a preference for channelling its regional security partnership in Africa primarily through other partners like the Africa Union, despite the opportunities available. The extent, then, to which a strategic partnership on peace on security actually exists is questionable.
Moreover, the current state of affairs potentially creates some gaps in the EU's ability to be a successful security actor in Africa.
Conclusion: Exploring the Unintended Consequences
In today's rapidly evolving security landscape, people, states, regions and indeed the global order is confronted with a host of challenges. In Africa, conflict is a main challenge to peace and prosperity, while everyday insecurities like gender inequality and poverty further entrench the constraints on security. In Europe, existing and potential conflicts in the EU's eastern neighbourhood, the self-inflicted 'migration crisis', terrorist attacks, and domestically, the rise of right wing populism, among other dynamicss, pose significant challenges for the role of the EU as an international security actor. Yet there is clear acknowledgement and evidence that many of these challenges are sources of concerns for both South Africa and the EU. They are thus opportunities for cooperation.
In this context, it is unsurprising that the EU remains the premier extra-regional actor on the African continent. To do this it relies on many entities, especially in its goals to combine security and development and ultimately effect human security regionally.
Given the strategic partnership with South Africa, one would expect the EU to leverage the relationship to meet its goals. However, its choice to not use an existing strategic partnership, strategically, is puzzling.
As the second section of this article shows, security cooperation is viewed as an extension of previous Africa-EU relations in the context of ACP-EU relations. For most of its history however, South Africa was mostly absent from that particular configuration. This has created a tension between the bilateralism of the EU-South
Africa Strategic Partnership and the multilateralism of the EU's regional approach to security. Moreover, the EU's own investment in the development of a continent-wide security architecture has meant that pragmatically, developing peace and security as an exclusive area of bilateralism has not been a priority despite potential entry points, as shown by the examples above. Rather, where the EU sees its leverage with South
Africa is in its roles as a regional rather than bilateral partner. 
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Yet, although South Africa itself prioritises the region, when it comes to its relationship with the EU it still seeks to maintain that unique standing which is represented by bilateralism in a lot of policy areas. This seeming schism between the perceptions of the two actors, however, extends beyond the nature of their bilateral relations. With the EU using its regional approach to engage with other countries amenable to the regional approach but lacking the partnership it shares with South Africa, this might create tensions between South Africa and other Africa countries, and indeed, the AU itself.
Thus one major unintended consequence of pursuing peace and security within the strategic partnership context is its potential to fragment security cooperation. This is assuming that the peace and security element of the strategic partnership grows beyond its current dormant state. But perhaps more telling is that due to the lacklustre actions undertaken under the auspices of the strategic partnership, if Pretoria insists on its bilateral nature, South Africa may be side-lined in favour of more amenable African partners on peace and security on the continent.
South Africa has been an effective partner on dialogue and this is evidenced by the creation of the Dialogue Facility. But if both partners do not agree to a shared understanding of a regional, multilateral approach to security, this may very well be the extent of peace and security cooperation within the strategic partnership. While South Africa's reach does extend beyond Africa, in the context of how the EU views its role, it may well be constrained to being a regional actor.
This article argues that despite a shared normative framework on security, the strategic partnership between the EU and South Africa excludes for the most part the areas of peace and security. This is due to the EU's preference for engaging on issues of peace and security as a regional good. Although South Africa is one of the core countries shaping the continental security agenda, this leverage is actually constrained by the specific context of the ten-year-old strategic partnership. 
